in Army when independence is proclaimed. The retention f a naval base in the Philippines would be taken as underwriting Philippine freedom. That the United States should ot do, for she would not be in a position to make good on he promise. Above all, the United States should avoid the ividious position of responsibility without authority. For .nee placing American interests first, make such trade agreenent with the Philippine Republic as is mutually profitable 5 iraw back the first line of defense to Hawaii and Alaska, and .void becoming a party to any arrangement which would inrolve the United States in dangerous political alliances with :oreign powers.

The only possible modification of this policy of America :or the Americans can come by joining in a treaty for the perDetual neutralization of the Philippines. The excuse for this Rrould be moral—the dislike of a tutor to see the child which has been carefully raised and educated devoured by the bad wolf. Also, America's responsibility under such a treaty would be joint, and possibly not particularly fraught with peril. But beyond that the United States should not go, and I am not altogether convinced that she should go that far.

As was to be expected, the decision of the United States to grant independence to the Philippines had repercussions in the Far East. The Netherlands could hardly view an independent Philippines with equanimity, because of the Islands* proximity to her own Indies and her oil reserves, and because of the incentive to native agitation among

Dutch subjects. The British Empire was similarly concerned because of the Philippine position dose to Hongkong, Borneo, Malaya, India, and Australia; indeed the building of the Singapore naval base goes on apace—and secretly. China looks with suspicion on Japan's intentions toward the Philippines, and Japan is sensitive to any trespassing on her rights in the Far East. The maintenance of the balance of power is as essential in the Western Pacific as in Eastern Europe. Betwixt national jeal-